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Abstract
This paper examines the wage gap between migrants and non-migrants in large
cities in Vietnam. It finds that migrants receive substantially lower wages than
non-migrants. The wage gap tends to be larger for older migrants. However,
once observed demographic characteristics of workers are controlled, there are no
differences in wages between migrants and non-migrants. The main difference in
observed wages between migrants and non-migrants is explained by differences in
age and education between migrants and non-migrants.
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1 Introduction
The most importance reason for migration is financial motivation and better
employment (Hicks 1932; Chiswick 1978; Borjas 2012). Harris and Todaro (1970)
argue that in developing countries, laborers from rural areas will move into cities as
they expect to earn higher wages in the urban areas without worrying about the
increasing level of unemployment in this area. According to the New Economics
Theory of Migration, migration is viewed as a collective decision of not only
individuals but also their families, and the main incentive for migration is high income
in destination areas (Stark and Bloom 1985; Stark and Taylor 1991; Stark 1991).
Migration has been viewed as an important source of poverty reduction in
developing countries (Taylor et al. 2005; Adams and Pages 2005; Acosta et al. 2007).
Migration also has other positive impacts on education, health, and production of
migrants as well as their families in home areas (Mountford 1997; Stark et al. 1997;
Beine et al. 2001; Kochar 2004; McKenzie 2006). However, there might be negative
effects of migration on the remaining people in home areas such as marital breakdown,
decreasing education, and health care for children (e.g., Katseli et al. 2006; McKenzie
2006; Antman 2010; Silver 2014).
A major concern for migrants is whether they are underpaid in destination areas
(Özden and Maurice 2006). There are serveral explanations for a wage gap between
migrant workers and native ones. Firstly, migrants tend to move from rural or less
advantageous areas to urban or more advantageous ones. Migrant workers tend to
have lower education, working skills, and experiences than native workers in
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destination areas (Lall et al. 2006; Maurer-Fazio et al. 2015). As a result, they receive
lower wages than the native workers. Secondly, as moving to a new area, migrants tend
to lack language skills, network, and information on employment opportunities
(Chiswick 1978; Borjas 2012). They are more likely to do jobs that they are
overqualified (Liu et al. 2004; Özden 2006; Lall et al. 2006). Thirdly, assymetric
information on labor productivity between employees and employers at the destination
areas also leads to a lower wage rate for migrant employees. Employers have less
information about migrants’ productivity and skills and tend to offer low-wage jobs for
migrants (Chiswick 1978). Fourthly, there might be a discrimination against migrants
in labor market. For example, in China, empirical studies share a conclusion that
discrimination is the major determinant of the earnings gap between migrants and
urban workers in urban China (e.g., Lee 2012 and Wang et al. 2013; Cheng et al. 2013;
Gagnon et al. 2014).
Borjas (2012) shows that earnings of migrants are initially lower than the natives, but
the gap in earnings will decrease over time as the migrants accumulate human capitals
and have better access to information on labor markets. Migrants will find better match
with the destination employers (Liu et al. 2004). Destination employers will also have
better information on migrants’ ability and provide more firm-specific training for their
migrant employees. Due to improvements in working skills, knowledge, and access to
information on labor markets, migrant workers will have higher earnings. Furthermore,
earnings of migrants can even surpass the native workers’ if they are positively selected
from the migrant population (Borjas 2012).
There are a large number of empirical evidences showing a gap in earnings between
migrants and natives, particularly in China. Overall, empirical studies find that migrants
from rural areas normally get fewer chances to get a job in the formal sector in the
urban areas, and as the consequence, their earnings are lower than native workers in
urban areas (Camarota 1998; Meng 2000; Meng and Zhang 2001; Özden 2006; Demur-
ger et al. 2009; Cheng et al. 2013; Liu and Kawata 2015). Camarota (1998) finds that
unskilled migrant workers are underpaid in the USA. Also, using the US data, Özden
(2006) finds that with the same skills, migrants earn less than the natives. Demurger et
al. (2009) show that the annual earnings of urban residents are 1.3 times larger than
that of long-term migrants from rural areas in China. Meng and Zhang (2001) show
that within an occupation, migrant peasants are underpaid while native workers are
overpaid in Shanghai city.
In this study, we examine the wage gap between migrant workers and native workers
in Hanoi capital city and Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC)—the two largest cities in
Vietnam. Internal migration has been an important aspect of Vietnamese society (Marx
and Fleischer 2010). According to the 2009 Population and Census of Vietnam, there
were 6.6 million people migrating within the country over the 2004–2009 period. This
is a significant increase compared with the 1999 Census data with 4.5 million people
migrating internally in Vietnam. Most internal migration in Vietnam is rural-to-urban
migration, especially migration to Hanoi and HCMC.
There are several studies looking at the effect of migration and remittances on
migrants’ origin households in Vietnam. Migration is found to have a positive effect on
households’ consumption and poverty reduction in studies such as De Brauw and
Harigaya (2007), Nguyen et al. (2008), and Nguyen et al. (2011). Using Vietnam
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Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS) 2002 and 2004, Nguyen (2008) finds that
international remittances help receiving households increase consumption and reduce
poverty. However, using the 2006 and 2008 VHLSSs, Nguyen and Mont (2012) and
Nguyen et al. (2013) do not find a poverty-reducing effect of international remittances.
Marx and Fleischer (2010) highlight that migrants are subject to less job security and
lower paid work compared to local residents. Their access to social, health, and
employment insurances are limited in the destination areas. Like China and several
countries, Vietnam maintains a household registration system to manage public
security and population movement (Demombynes and Vu 2016). People without a house-
hold registration book (or permanent residence permission) in an area have less access to
public services such as education and health care. In China, Demurger et al. (2009) point
out that the household registration system is one of the main determinants for the
earnings gap between migrants and non-migrants. Liu (2015) uses the Vietnam
Rural-Urban Migration Survey 2013 (VRUMS2013) and the Vietnam Household Living
Standard Survey 2012 (VHLSS2012) to investigate the wage gap between migrants and
non-migrants, and she finds that the migrants are more likely to have low-wage jobs than
the non-migrants.
In this study, we not only examine the wage gap between migrant workers and native
workers but also try to understand factors associated with this gap. To do so, we will
use data from the 2009 Urban Poverty Survey to estimate the wage gap between
migrants and non-migrants in the two largest cities in Vietnam. Then, the
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition technique will be used to decompose the wage gap into
different components due to differences in demographic and education variables between
the migrants and non-migrants.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The second section introduces
the data set used in this study. The third section describes the pattern of migration and
characteristics of migrants in large cities in Vietnam. The fourth section presents the
estimation methodology. Empirical findings will be presented in the fifth sections, and
the sixth section concludes.
2 Data source
This study relies mainly on data from the Urban Poverty Survey (UPS), which was
conducted by the Hanoi Statistics Office and the HCMC Statistics Office in
October 2009. The survey sample is representative for Hanoi and HCMC. The
main objectives of the 2009 UPS are to assess urban poverty in Hanoi and HCMC.
Normally, household surveys often rely on a population frame which contains only
registered households. As a result, household surveys tend to underestimate the
proportion of migrants. The 2009 UPS has a special sampling selection design so
that it covered not only the registered households but also unregistered households
and individuals. In addition, it also sampled homeless individuals and those living
in dormitories and company campuses.
Data from this survey are very detailed, including income, consumption, employment,
education, health care, and risks. The number of observations of the 2009 UPS is 1637
and 1712 households for Hanoi and HCMC, respectively. It should be noted that these
two cities contain not only urban but also rural areas. The number of urban and rural
households in the data set is 2280 and 1069, respectively. In this study, we focus the
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analysis on individuals who are above 14 years old and employed or wage earners.
Self-employed individuals are excluded from the sample, since we do not have data
on their wages. The number of individuals used in this study is 3778.
3 Migrants to large cities in Vietnam
A large proportion of people in Hanoi and HCMC are migrants from other areas.
In this study, we define migrants as those who do not have a household registra-
tion book (called Ho Khau in Vietnamese) in Hanoi or HCMC. The household
registration system has been implemented in Vietnam since 1964 to manage public
security and population movement (Demombynes and Vu 2016). According to this
system, a person has to register his/her residence in an local areas and is provided
with a household registration book of that area (a permanent residence permission
in that area). In other words, a household registration book is a statement that
household members are permanent residents in one location. Having a registration
book in an area, people are more easily to have access to social services such as
education and health insurance in that area.
Prior 2007, the residence regulation in Vietnam requires that anyone who are living
in a place other than their permanent residence over 30 days have to register their
temporary status with the destination police. However, changing residential status was
very complicated process because the migrants had to obtain a letter of release from
sending authorities where they hold their registration book. It is much more
complicated and difficult to get a permanent registration in cities. Since 2007, when the
new Law on Residence took effect, many requirements and conditions in obtaining
permanent residency are eased. According to the new Law, the number of residence
status are just two—temporary and permanent, and the Law also removed any legal
conditionality of employment for registration (Marx and Fleischer 2010). To obtain a
registration book in Hanoi or HCMC, people must live in the city for at least 2 years
(based on temporary residential booklet record) and prove that they have a legal
residence place (a house or an apartment). Although transfer of registration books from
one province to Hanoi or HCMCs is easier than before, it requires a complicated
paperwork procedure (Demombynes and Vu 2016).
As mentioned, we define overall migrants as those who do not have a registration
book in Hanoi or HCMC. To capture the short-term migration, we use the second
definition in which a person is defined as a short-term migrant if she/he has no
registration books and has lived in Hanoi and HCMC since 2008, i.e., have lived in the
cities for less than 2 years.
It should be noted that non-migrants defined in this study include individuals
who have a registration book (permanent residence permission) in Hanoi or
HCMC. They can include people who have lived in the cities less than 2 years, but
they have been able to obtain a registration book already. The definition of overall
migrants and non-migrants does not depend on how long people have lived in the
cities but on whether they have a registration book in the cities.
Figure 1 shows that the proportion of overall migrants, i.e., people without a
registration book in Hanoi and HCMC, was 17.3 % in 2009. The proportion of
short-term migrants, i.e., people having lived in the cities since 2008 and not
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having a registration book, was 2.4 %. The proportion of migrants was very high
among young adults aged from 15 to 25.
Table 1 compares the employment status between migrant workers and non-
migrant ones in the two largest cities in Vietnam. Occupation of individuals are
classified into six mutually exclusive categories. The proportion of unskilled and
agricultural workers is much higher in migrants, especially in Hanoi. In Hanoi,
the proportion of unskilled and agricultural workers is 34.7 and 55.2 % for overall
migrants and short-term migrants, respectively. This figure is only 7.6 % for non-
migrants.
Non-migrants tend to work in the public sector, while migrants are more likely
to work in the private and foreign sector than non-migrants. Migrants tend to
work in informal sectors (without labor contracts) and do not have health
insurance. Migrants have much lower wages than non-migrants. Monthly wages of
non-migrants are around 44 % higher than that of migrants. More specifically,
monthly wages of migrants and non-migrants are equal to 2480 and 3590
thousand VND, respectively. Short-term migrants have even lower monthly wages,
at 2066 thousand VND, less than one-half wages of non-migrants.
Table 2 presents basic characteristics of the migrants and non-migrants.
Compared with non-migrants, migrants, especially short-term ones, tend to be
younger and single and have lower education degrees. Migrants are more likely to
live in a temporary house without tap water, in a house without concrete roof or a
flush latrine than non-migrants. A large proportion of migrants are living in a
dormitory. More specifically, 56.8 % of migrants and 65.7 % of short-term migrants
lived in a dormitory in 2009.
4 Methodology
In this study, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and propensity score
matching to examine the wage gap between the migrant workers and non-migrant ones.
To understand the factors associated with the wage gap, we use the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition technique.
Fig. 1 Percentage of migrants by age. Source: Authors’ estimation from the 2009 UPS
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Table 1 Employment and wages of migrants and non-migrants




























Proportion of workers by occupation (in percent)
Manager and army 4.02 0.04 0.06 4.91 0.16 0.17 3.48 0.00 0.00
Technician 34.52 13.32 4.70 46.02 21.14 4.18 27.59 10.66 4.98
Service, clerk, officer 18.56 13.91 11.96 14.66 15.16 13.43 20.91 13.49 11.18
Skilled worker 16.32 24.07 24.64 16.08 22.13 20.61 16.47 24.73 26.78
Machine users 14.90 24.47 23.95 10.69 6.74 6.44 17.43 30.49 33.23
Unskilled and farmers 11.68 24.19 34.68 7.64 34.67 55.17 14.11 20.62 23.84
Proportion of workers by industry (in percent)
Agriculture 1.11 0.68 1.06 0.93 0.43 0.68 1.22 0.76 1.27
Industry 38.87 58.20 59.38 33.89 35.37 29.19 41.88 65.96 75.36
Services 60.02 41.12 39.56 65.18 64.20 70.13 56.90 33.28 23.37
Proportion of workers by economic sector (in percent)
State 35.22 5.86 2.52 51.72 9.76 3.26 25.27 4.53 2.13
Private firms 32.31 40.05 37.63 24.02 29.04 17.05 37.31 43.80 48.52
Households 20.65 35.74 44.57 14.41 50.42 68.60 24.42 30.75 31.85
Foreign 11.82 18.34 15.28 9.85 10.78 11.08 13.00 20.92 17.50
Monthly wage
(thousand VND)























70.34 41.27 26.26 78.38 32.42 19.41 65.49 44.28 29.89
Number of observations 2008 1770 566 1122 777 294 886 993 272
Note: Non-migrants are individuals who have a registration book in Hanoi or HCMC. Migrants are individuals who do not have a registration book in the cities. Short-term migrants are migrants who have lived in the
cities since 2008















Table 2 Characteristics of migrants and non-migrants





























Age 34.82 28.32 26.00 35.90 29.63 29.49 34.18 27.87 24.15
% male 54.75 49.07 48.70 55.13 39.28 29.47 54.52 52.40 58.88
% never married 29.44 51.96 64.79 20.65 49.49 51.51 34.75 52.80 71.82
% living in urban areas 74.85 77.49 73.98 64.06 69.27 72.63 81.36 80.29 74.69
Proportion of workers by education degree (in percent)
No degree 4.68 8.98 8.59 0.61 3.95 5.33 7.13 10.70 10.31
Primary 9.72 21.06 25.34 1.96 11.23 16.36 14.40 24.40 30.10
Lower secondary 21.84 33.24 37.19 17.15 30.23 40.76 24.68 34.26 35.31
Upper secondary 29.77 25.09 24.34 36.56 36.20 30.87 25.68 21.31 20.88
Post secondary 33.99 11.63 4.54 43.72 18.39 6.68 28.11 9.33 3.40
Household composition
Household size 4.36 2.13 1.63 4.39 1.76 1.20 4.34 2.25 1.85
Percentage of children under
15 in household
19.35 7.53 2.92 20.90 5.84 2.25 18.42 8.11 3.28
Percentage of people above
60 in household
7.96 1.15 0.10 8.75 1.57 0.28 7.48 1.00 0.00
Proportion of workers who live in (in percent)















Table 2 Characteristics of migrants and non-migrants (Continued)
House with concrete roof 41.65 18.77 17.58 71.84 31.07 24.15 23.44 14.59 14.10
House with flush toilet 92.06 81.16 72.93 91.38 70.70 53.15 92.47 84.71 83.40
House with tap water 67.71 35.96 31.47 75.43 53.17 36.42 63.05 30.10 28.84
Number of observations 2008 1770 566 1122 777 294 886 993 272
Note: Non-migrants are individuals who have a registration book in Hanoi or HCMC. Migrants are individuals who do not have a registration book in the cities. Short-term migrants are migrants who have lived in the
cities since 2008















4.1 Wage gaps between migrants and non-migrants
We use both OLS regression and propensity score matching to examine the wage
gap between the migrants and non-migrants. Firstly, we regress log of wages on
individual and community variables as follows:
ln Wið Þ ¼ αþ XiβþMiγ þ εi; ð1Þ
where Wi is the monthly wages of individual i, Xi is a vector of individual and
community variables of individual i, Mi is the dummy variable of migration status
which is equal to 1 for migrants and 0 otherwise, and εi denotes the unobserved
variables that follow a normal distribution with zero mean. The wage gap between the
migrants and non-migrants is measured by γ. We tend to select more exogenous
control variables including sex, age, education, marital status, urban, and dummy of
Hanoi. The summary statistics of the control variables is presented in Table 8 in
Appendix. We estimate model (1) using OLS regression.
Secondly, we use a propensity score matching method to estimate the wage gap as a
sensitivity analysis in addition to the OLS regression.1 The difference in wages between
the migrant and non-migrants given observed variables X is expressed as follows:
ΔE W jXð Þ ¼ E W jX;M ¼ 1ð Þ−E W jX;M ¼ 0ð Þ; ð2Þ
The matching method estimates the difference in the average wages between migrants
and non-migrants who have similar distribution of the X variables. To match the non-
migrants with migrants, we use a propensity score matching method (Rosenbaum and
Rubin 1983). More specifically, we start by estimating the probability of being migrants
conditional on the X variables using a probit model. The predicted probability is called
the propensity score. Then, the non-migrants are matched with migrants based on the
closeness of the propensity score. These matched non-migrants form the comparison
group who have similar X variables as the migrants.2 The difference in the wages between
the migrants and the matched non-migrants is the wage gap controlled for the differences
in the observed variables X. Compared with parametric regression, the propensity score
matching relaxes the assumption on functional forms of monthly wages.
4.2 Decomposition of wage gaps
According to description analysis in the third section of this paper, there is a large gap
in monthly wages between migrants and non-migrants in large cities. We use an
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method to examine the factors associated with this
wage gap. Firstly, we run separate regressions of log of monthly wages for migrants and
non-migrants:
ln Ymð Þ ¼ αm þ Xmβm þ εm; ð3Þ
ln Y nmð Þ ¼ αnm þ Xnmβnm þ εnm: ð4Þ
The subscript i, which denotes individuals, is dropped for simplicity. Subscripts
m and nm denote migrants and non-migrants, respectively.
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition technique is widely used to decompose gaps
in a dependent variable between two groups into a gap due to differences in
explanatory variables and a gap due to differences in coefficients of the
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explanatory variables. The estimator of the gap in the monthly wages is presented
as follows:
ΔE^ ln Yð Þ½  ¼ E^ ln Y nmð Þ½ −E^ ln Ymð Þ½ 
¼ α^nm þ X nmβ^nm
 
− α^m þ Xmβ^m
 
¼ X nm−Xmð Þ β^nm þ β^m2
 !
þ β^nm−β^m





where α^ and β^ are estimators of parameters in regression (3) and (4). Xm and X nm are
the means of the explanatory variables of migrants and non-migrants, respectively.
The first term in Eq. (5) is the gap in monthly wages between migrants and non-
migrants resulting from the difference in household characteristics. The second term
can be explained as the difference in monthly wages resulting from the different returns
to individual characteristics. The third term is the difference that is still unexplained by
the current regression models of wages.
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition focuses on the effect of explanatory variables on
the mean of wage gap between migrants and non-migrants. Recently, Machado and
Mata (2005) propose a method to decompose the effect on the entire wage distribution.
In this study, we simply focus on the wage gap mean, and as a result, we use the
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method for simplicity. One problem with the Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition method is that the results are different when different groups,
either migrants or non-migrants, are selected as the reference group. In this study, we
tried different groups as the reference, and the results are very similar. For a neutral
selection of a reference group, we use the average of explanatory variables and
regression coefficients of migrants and non-migrants as the reference group (Eq. 5). In
this paper, we will use the results from this selection for interpretation.3
5 Empirical results
5.1 Wage gaps between migrants and non-migrants
This section presents the empirical analysis of wage gaps between migrants and non-
migrants in Hanoi and HCMC. Table 3 presents probit regressions of probability of
migration and OLS regressions of monthly wages on migration status of employed
individuals. Migration is most common among younger and more educated workers.
Older people are less likely to move since migration is a human capital investment, and
older workers have a shorter period to collect migration investment returns. The
shorter payoff period decreases the net gain to migration; thus, it lowers the probability
of migration (Borjas 2012).
Similar to descriptive analysis in Table 2, migrants are more likely to be single, since
the cost of migration for a single individual is lower that for a whole family. Migrants
have lower education than non-migrants even after the control variables such as age
and gender are controlled.
As discussed in the previous section, migrants have substantially lower wages than
non-migrants (Table 1). However, Table 3 shows that once observed variables are
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controlled, the gap in monthly wages between the migrants and non-migrants is very
small and not statistically significant. It means that the gap in wages between the migrants
and non-migrants is mainly explained by the differences in the control variables.
Other control variables are statistically significant and have expected sign. Female
workers tend to have lower wages than male workers. Married, older, and more educated
workers have higher wages than single, younger, and less educated workers, respectively.
In Table 4, we include interactions between migration variables and age and age
squared of workers to examine how the wage gap between migrants and non-migrants
Table 3 Regression of migration status and monthly wages







variable is “log of
monthly wages”
OLS: dependent
variable is “log of
monthly wages”





(short-term migrant = 1,
other individuals = 0)
−0.029
[0.0314]
Age −0.0589*** −0.0605*** 0.0698*** 0.0686***
[0.0069] [0.0108] [0.0090] [0.0091]
Age squared −0.0009*** −0.0009***
[0.0001] [0.0001]
Sex (male = 1; female = 0) −0.1471 −0.0876 0.2201*** 0.2198***
[0.1048] [0.1513] [0.0232] [0.0232]
Never married (yes = 1) 0.2734** 0.6248*** −0.1098*** −0.1084***
[0.1228] [0.1733] [0.0286] [0.0285]
Urban (urban = 1; rural = 0) 0.5531*** 0.3824** 0.0919*** 0.0944***
[0.1286] [0.1919] [0.0230] [0.0225]
Hanoi (yes = 1) 0.0323 0.8329*** −0.0800*** −0.0786***
[0.1111] [0.1883] [0.0237] [0.0238]
No degree Reference
Primary −0.0928 0.1652 0.067 0.0678
[0.2709] [0.3499] [0.0601] [0.0599]
Lower secondary −0.4352* −0.2894 0.1566*** 0.1548***
[0.2484] [0.3346] [0.0562] [0.0562]
Upper secondary −1.1291*** −1.1008*** 0.3288*** 0.3232***
[0.2581] [0.3682] [0.0572] [0.0574]
Post secondary −1.9677*** −2.6512*** 0.9042*** 0.8957***
[0.2651] [0.4136] [0.0615] [0.0616]
Constant 1.3528*** −0.7005 6.1532*** 6.1869***
[0.3425] [0.5561] [0.1647] [0.1661]
Observations 3778 3778 3778 3778
R-squared 0.14 0.16 0.40 0.40
Note: Non-migrants are individuals who have a registration book in Hanoi or HCMC. Migrants are individuals who do not
have a registration book in the cities. Short-term migrants are migrants who have lived in the cities since 2008. Post-
secondary education degrees include college, bachelor, and above. Robust standard errors in brackets (standard errors are
corrected for sampling weights and cluster correlation)
*Significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; ***significant at 1 %
Source: Estimation from the 2009 UPS
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Table 4 Regression of wages with interaction between migration and migrants’ age
Explanatory variables OLS: dependent
variable is “log of
monthly wages”
OLS: dependent
variable is “log of
monthly wages”
OLS: dependent
variable is “log of
monthly wages”
OLS: dependent
variable is “log of
monthly wages”












Migration since 2008 0.1840** 0.5123**
[0.0813] [0.2353]
Migration since 2008 age* −0.0075*** −0.0304**
[0.0026] [0.0151]




Age 0.0740*** 0.0780*** 0.0697*** 0.0711***
[0.0093] [0.0110] [0.0093] [0.0097]
Age squared −0.0009*** −0.0010*** −0.0009*** −0.0009***
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Sex (male = 1; female = 0) 0.2122*** 0.2136*** 0.2141*** 0.2149***
[0.0232] [0.0231] [0.0232] [0.0232]
Never married (yes = 1) −0.1106*** −0.1124*** −0.1092*** −0.1096***
[0.0283] [0.0282] [0.0282] [0.0282]
Urban (urban = 1; rural = 0) 0.0843*** 0.0823*** 0.0913*** 0.0903***
[0.0230] [0.0232] [0.0222] [0.0223]
Hanoi (yes = 1) −0.1099*** −0.1123*** −0.1070*** −0.1079***
[0.0236] [0.0238] [0.0237] [0.0237]
No degree Reference
Primary 0.0649 0.0649 0.0723 0.0712
[0.0591] [0.0591] [0.0596] [0.0596]
Lower secondary 0.1453*** 0.1477*** 0.1534*** 0.1523***
[0.0553] [0.0551] [0.0560] [0.0561]
Upper secondary 0.3148*** 0.3187*** 0.3163*** 0.3167***
[0.0563] [0.0561] [0.0572] [0.0573]
Post secondary 0.8794*** 0.8830*** 0.8809*** 0.8809***
[0.0606] [0.0603] [0.0615] [0.0616]
Constant 6.0866*** 6.0154*** 6.1770*** 6.1554***
[0.1727] [0.1985] [0.1693] [0.1755]
Observations 3778 3778 3778 3778
R-squared 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
Note: Non-migrants are individuals who have a registration book in Hanoi or HCMC. Migrants are individuals who do not have
a registration book in the cities. Short-term migrants are migrants who have lived in the cities since 2008. Post-secondary
education degrees include college, bachelor, and above. Robust standard errors in brackets (standard errors are corrected for
sampling weights and cluster correlation)
*Significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; ***significant at 1 %
Source: Estimation from the 2009 UPS
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varies across age. According to Borjas (2012), the wage gap is larger for younger
workers and tends to be converge as the age of workers increases. If the migrants have
high education and skills, their wage can be even higher than the wage of the local
workers. In other words, there can be an inverted-U shape relation between age and
wage gap between migrants and non-migrants. Table 4 shows that the interaction
between migration and age-squared variable is not statistically significant. It implies
that there is no an inverted-U shape or a U-shape relation between the wage gap and
age. Interestingly, the interactions between age and migration are negative and
statistically significant. The negative sign of the interactions means that the wage gap is
larger for the older migrants than that for the younger ones. Possibly, younger migrants
are more dynamic and able to find high-wage jobs than older migrants.
It should be noted that this finding is not absolutely contradictory to the prediction
of Borjas (2012). According to our definition, non-migrants also include non-native
people. There are migrants who obtained a registration book in Hanoi or HCMC. To
test the hypothesis of the inverted-U shape relation in Borjas (2012), we need panel
data on migrants and non-migrants. However, the panel data are not available in
our study.
Table 5 presents estimates of the wage gap between the migrants and non-migrants
using the propensity matching method. The propensity scores are estimated using
probit models in Table 3. There is a large common support with 95 % of the treatment
and control groups falling into the commune support. Figure 2 in Appendix presents
the distribution of predicted propensity scores of the migrants and non-migrants.
Similar to regression results, the wage gap estimated by the propensity score matching
method is very small and not statistically significant.
5.2 Decomposition of wage gaps
There is a large gap in monthly wages between migrants and non-migrants in Hanoi
and HCMC. When differences in observed explanatory variables are controlled for, this
wage gap is small and not statistically significant. In this section, the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition method is used to understand which explanatory variables contribute to
the gap in monthly wages between migrants and non-migrants.
Tables 6 and 7 present separate regressions of monthly wages for migrants and non-
migrants and decomposition of wage gaps. The last two columns present the
contribution of the explanatory variables and returns to these variables to the total
wage gap. The difference in the controlled variables contributes 97.1 percentage points
to the wage gap (Table 6). Among the control variables, age and holding a post-
secondary education degree are the most important factors contributing the wage gap.
The returns to these control variables (contribution of β) is lower for the migrants than
that for the non-migrants. The difference in the returns accounts for 30.8 percentage
points of the wage gap. So the unobserved factors reduce the wage gap between the
migrants and non-migrants by 27.9 percentage points.
Table 7 presents the decomposition of the wage gap between the short-term migrants
and non-migrants. It shows that short-term migrants have substantially lower returns
to human capital than non-migrants. As a result, the difference in the control variables
contributes 85.1 percentage points to the wage gap, while the difference in the returns
Nguyen and Minh IZA Journal of Migration  (2016) 5:20 Page 14 of 23
Table 5 Estimates from propensity score matching
Matching scheme Effect of “no registration book” Effect of “migration since 2008”
Treated (migrant) (Y1) Controls (non-migrant) (Y0) Difference (Y1 − Y0) Treated (migrant) (Y1) Controls (non-migrant) (Y0) Difference (Y1 − Y0)
Mean Std. Er. Mean Std. Er.
1 nearest neighbor 2630.0 2539.6 90.4 113.8 2278.0 2312.6 −34.6 146.0
5 nearest neighbors 2630.0 2529.9 100.1 99.5 2278.0 2366.7 −88.7 93.5
Kernel, bandwidth 0.01 2630.0 2516.9 113.1 117.8 2280.3 2379.7 −99.5 109.1
Kernel, bandwidth 0.03 2630.0 2527.2 102.8 115.4 2278.0 2392.9 −114.9 106.1
Kernel, bandwidth 0.05 2630.0 2533.4 96.7 114.8 2278.0 2415.1 −137.1 104.5
Note: Treated are overall migrants and short-term migrants. Controls are matched non-migrants. Standard errors are calculated using bootstrap with 500 replications (standard errors are corrected for sampling weights
and cluster correlation)
*Significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; ***significant at 1 %















Table 6 Decomposition of wage gap between employees with registration book and employees without registration book
Variables Xnm Xm βnm βm (Xnm − Xm)*((βnm + βm)/2) (βnm − βm)*((Xnm + Xm)/2) Contrition of X (%) Contrition of β (%)
Age 34.823*** 28.316*** 0.0763*** 0.0692*** 0.4733*** 0.2220 184.67*** 86.61
[0.299] [0.377] [0.0114] [0.0111] [0.0652] [0.5279] [32.65] [209.17]
Age squared 1331.64*** 892.82*** −0.0010*** −0.0009*** −0.4222*** −0.0387 −164.73*** −15.12
[23.53] [26.98] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0625] [0.2507] [30.77] [98.67]
Sex (male = 1; female = 0) 0.5475*** 0.4907*** 0.2120*** 0.2402*** 0.0128** −0.0147 5.00*** −5.72
[0.0136] [0.0186] [0.0305] [0.0291] [0.0053] [0.0228] [2.06] [9.17]
Never married (yes = 1) 0.2944*** 0.5196*** −0.1389*** −0.0376 0.0199*** −0.0412** 7.75*** −16.09**
[0.0131] [0.0187] [0.0383] [0.0314] [0.0061] [0.0203] [2.49] [8.09]
Urban (urban = 1; rural = 0) 0.7485*** 0.7749*** 0.1032*** 0.0144 −0.0016 0.0676** −0.61 26.39**
[0.0112] [0.0147] [0.0308] [0.0322] [0.0013] [0.0346] [0.52] [13.37]
Hanoi (yes = 1) 0.3763*** 0.2537*** −0.1008*** −0.0209 −0.0075** −0.0252** −2.91*** −9.82*
[0.0121] [0.0135] [0.0307] [0.0308] [0.0028] [0.0137] [1.14] [5.29]
Primary 0.0972*** 0.2106*** −0.0282 0.1741** −0.0083 −0.0311* −3.23 −12.15*
[0.0082] [0.0163] [0.0834] [0.0818] [0.0069] [0.0175] [2.64] [6.92]
Lower secondary 0.2184*** 0.3324*** 0.0664 0.2593*** −0.0186** −0.0531* −7.24*** −20.73*
[0.0121] [0.0169] [0.0752] [0.0786] [0.0070] [0.0296] [2.73] [11.78]
Upper secondary 0.2977*** 0.2509*** 0.2791*** 0.3556*** 0.0149** −0.0210 5.80** −8.18
[0.0124] [0.0164] [0.0753] [0.0806] [0.0072] [0.0296] [2.84] [11.66]
Post secondary 0.3399*** 0.1163*** 0.8633*** 0.8006*** 0.1860*** 0.0143 72.58*** 5.58


















Table 6 Decomposition of wage gap between employees with registration book and employees without registration book (Continued)
R-squared in regression 0.40 0.37
Decomposition
ln(Ynm) − ln(Ym) Contrition of X Contrition of β Contrition of α Contrition of β and α
Absolute 0.2563*** 0.2488*** 0.0789 −0.0714 0.0074
[0.0258] [0.0198] [0.3069] [0.3132] [0.0261]
Percentage 100*** 97.10*** 30.78 −27.88 2.90
[0] [10.21] [121.03] [123.80] [10.21]
Note: Non-migrants are individuals who have a registration book in Hanoi or HCMC. Migrants are individuals who do not have a registration book in the cities. Short-term migrants are migrants who have lived in the
cities since 2008. Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are estimated using bootstrap with 500 replications (standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and cluster correlation)
*Significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; ***significant at 1 %















Table 7 Decomposition of wage gap between employees with registration book and employees without registration book and migration since 2008
Variables Xnm Xm βnm βm (Xnm − Xm)* ((βnm + βm)/2) (βnm − βm)* ((Xnm + Xm)/2) Contrition of X (%) Contrition of β (%)
Age 33.592*** 25.996*** 0.0728*** 0.0382*** 0.4216*** 1.0336** 107.46*** 263.45**
[0.251] [0.648] [0.0098] [0.0138] [0.0754] [0.5042] [20.35] [137.03]
Age squared 1244.60*** 781.70*** −0.0009*** −0.0006*** −0.3543*** −0.3615 −90.30*** −92.14
[19.25] [42.61] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0649] [0.2348] [17.96] [62.54]
Sex (male = 1; female = 0) 0.5353*** 0.4870*** 0.2197*** 0.2229*** 0.0107 −0.0017 2.72 −0.42
[0.0122] [0.0346] [0.0251] [0.0461] [0.0084] [0.0276] [2.11] [7.14]
Never married (yes = 1) 0.3327*** 0.6479*** −0.1041*** −0.1873** 0.0459*** 0.0408 11.71*** 10.40
[0.0112] [0.0323] [0.0298] [0.0937] [0.0170] [0.0504] [4.72] [13.28]
Urban (urban = 1; rural = 0) 0.7575*** 0.7398*** 0.0935*** 0.0885 0.0016 0.0038 0.41 0.97
[0.0093] [0.0306] [0.0243] [0.0546] [0.0031] [0.0446] [0.81] [11.49]
Hanoi (yes = 1) 0.3409*** 0.3461*** −0.0785*** −0.0526 0.0003 −0.0089 0.09 −2.27
[0.0099] [0.0299] [0.0258] [0.0499] [0.0022] [0.0195] [0.56] [5.02]
Primary 0.1184*** 0.2534*** 0.0609 0.1085 −0.0114 −0.0089 −2.91 −2.26
[0.0082] [0.0295] [0.0673] [0.0823] [0.0083] [0.0201] [2.18] [5.21]
Lower secondary 0.2401*** 0.3719*** 0.1508** 0.1470* −0.0196** 0.0012 −5.00** 0.29
[0.0103] [0.0307] [0.0627] [0.0799] [0.0085] [0.0322]** [2.21] [8.39]
Upper secondary 0.2880*** 0.2434*** 0.3250*** 0.2626** 0.0131 0.0166 3.34 4.23
[0.0104] [0.0281] [0.0634] [0.1041] [0.0098] [0.0328] [2.53] [8.47]
Post secondary 0.2968*** 0.0454*** 0.8917*** 0.9052*** 0.2259*** −0.0023 57.58*** −0.59


















Table 7 Decomposition of wage gap between employees with registration book and employees without registration book and migration since 2008 (Continued)
R-squared in regression 0.39 0.30
Decomposition
ln(Ynm) − ln(Ym) Contrition of X Contrition of β Contrition of α Contrition of β and α
Absolute 0.3923*** 0.3339*** 0.7127** −0.6542** 0.0585*
[0.0296] [0.0274] [0.2999] [0.3087] [0.0330]
Percentage 100*** 85.10*** 181.66** −166.76** 14.90*
[0] [7.85] [81.02] [83.69] [7.85]
Note: Non-migrants are individuals who have a registration book in Hanoi or HCMC. Migrants are individuals who do not have a registration book in the cities. Short-term migrants are migrants who have lived in the
cities since 2008. Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are estimated using bootstrap with 500 replications (standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and cluster correlation)
*Significant at 10 %; **significant at 5 %; ***significant at 1 %















to these variables contributes 181.7 percentage points to the wage gap. It also
implies that factors that are not controlled in the model reduce the wage gap by
166.8 percentage points.
6 Conclusions
Vietnam is a transition country with an increasing migration. Although there is a large
number of studies on migration and remittances in Vietnam, there have been no
studies on the wage gap between migrants and non-migrants. Using a survey of
households and individuals in Hanoi and HCMC, this study examines the charac-
teristics of migrants and the wage gap between migrants and non-migrants. It finds that
migrants in the cities are younger and less educated than non-migrants. With less
experiences and low education, migrants are more likely to work in the informal sector
and receive lower wages than non-migrants.
Using regression and propensity score matching analysis, we find that the wage
gap between migrants and non-migrants is negligible once the observed variables
are controlled for. In other words, migrants are not underpaid given their gender,
marital status, age, and education. We use the decomposition techniques to under-
stand factors contributing the wage gap between migrants and non-migrants. The
difference in the means of controlled variables contributes mainly to the wage gap.
Among these demographic variables, age and holding a post-secondary education
degree are the most important factors contributing the wage gap. The returns to
these variables is lower for the migrants than that for the non-migrants. However,
the difference in the returns does not contribute largely and significantly to the
wage gap.
The findings from this study imply that migrants in cities in Vietnam are not
underpaid. There is no discrimination against migrants. The main reason why migrants
have lower wages than non-migrants is the gap in age and education between migrants
and non-migrants. To obtain higher wages, migrants should have better education and
improve working skills through vocational training.
Endnotes
1Matching methods are widely used in impact evaluation (for review, see Heckman
et al. 1997; Augurzky and Schmidt 2001; Imbens and Wooldridge 2009).
2Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that a treatment and a control group can be
matched based on the propensity score instead of the vector of X variables.
3Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions can have other expressions as follows,
depending on which groups, migrants or non-migrants, are selected as the
reference group:
ΔE ln Yð Þ½  ¼ X nm−Xmð Þβ^nm þ β^nm−β^m
 
Xm þ α^nm−α^mð Þ:
ΔE ln Yð Þ½  ¼ Xnm−Xmð Þβ^m þ β^nm−β^m
 
Xnm þ α^nm−α^mð Þ:
For a neutral selection of the coefficients of the differences, we use Eq. (5) in this study.
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Table 8 Summary statistics of variables in regressions
Variables Type Mean Std. Dev.
Monthly wages (thousand VND) Continuous 3062.0 2577.9
Do not have registration book Binary 0.469 0.499
Migration since 2008 Binary 0.150 0.357
Age Discrete 31.132 10.718
Sex (male = 1; female = 0) Binary 0.555 0.497
Never married (yes = 1) Binary 0.439 0.496
Urban (urban = 1; rural = 0) Binary 0.680 0.467
Hanoi (yes = 1) Binary 0.503 0.500
No degree Binary 0.049 0.215
Primary Binary 0.134 0.341
Lower secondary Binary 0.262 0.440
Upper secondary Binary 0.300 0.459
Post secondary Binary 0.255 0.436
Number of observations 3778
Source: Estimation from the 2009 UPS
Overall migration Short-term migration
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Non-migrants Migrants
0 .2 .4 .6
Propensity Score
Non-migrants Short-term migrants
Fig. 2 Predicted propensity score of migration. Source: Authors’ estimation from the 2009 UPS
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